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In one of two sectors, there are labor quality pricing distortions in the sense that labor
obtains the average rather than marginal product. This may be due to a failure on the part of
employers to observe individual labor quality or due to an income redistributing union. Relatively
low quality workers are in equilibrium employed in the sector characterized by average producti-
vity wage setting. International differences in the quality distributions of the labor force are shown
to be a source of comparative advantage and hence a determinant of international trade. The
country that imports the good produced by relatively low quality workers may lose from internatio-
nal trade. Immigration by low quality workers may equally lower the welfare of a country’s
original inhabitants. As a result, a country generally benefits from restricting the immigration of
very low quality workers.1
1. Introduction
This paper examines a simple two sector model of international trade and migration. Labor
is the only factor of production. Workers are heterogeneous in their labor quality defined as their
effective capacity for work. The two sectors differ in that workers in one sector are paid their
marginal product, while workers in the other sector receive their average product regardless of
individual worker quality. The latter sector thus is characterized by labor quality spillovers in the
pricing of labor. In this setting, national differences in labor quality distributions are a source of
comparative advantage and hence a determinant of international trade. A country that is endowed
with relatively many high quality workers, for instance, exports the good produced in the sector
characterized by marginal productivity wage setting.
A group of workers may be paid their average rather than their individual marginal product
for a variety of reason. First, employers may observe only the group’s total output without being
able to discern the contribution of individual workers to this total product. This may be the case if
work is performed by teams of workers rather than simply by individual workers. At the same
time, average productivity wage setting may exist where effective monitoring of individual workers
is prohibitively costly. Also, workers may effectively be paid their average product on account of
union wage setting which implicitly redistributes income from high productivity workers to low
productivity workers. The technology of monitoring and the extent of unionization differ across
sectors. The relevance of average rather than marginal productivity wage setting thus can also be
expected to differ across sectors.
Several authors have examined international trade and migration in the presence of labor
market distortions.
1 Brander and Spencer (1988) and Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), among
others, consider international goods trade and trade policy in case of a partly unionized internatio-
nal oligopoly. Rivera-Batiz (1981) considers migration into a two-sector national economy
characterized by sectoral union wage setting and unemployment.
2 Staiger (1988) further considers
how the presence of a labor union with an exogenous membership in one country affects the
pattern of international trade and migration. Apart from their union status, all workers are the
same. In Staiger (1988), the partly unionized country is shown to specialize in the production of
goods that are relatively labor unintensive. Closest to the present paper perhaps is a contribution by
Copeland (1989) on efficiency wages in a Ricardian model of international trade. Copeland in2
particular considers how international differences in the monitoring technology or in workers’
preferences for leisure determine the pattern of trade. Monitoring is explicitly treated as a separate
activity in the extension by Brecher (1992). The present paper differs from earlier contributions in
the labor market distortion that is examined. As a result, national distributions of worker qualities
play a key role in determining the pattern of production and of international trade.
In the present paper, all workers of a quality below a certain threshold level will be
employed in the spillover sector. The labor pricing distortion in the spillover sector leads to an
inefficiently low level of output of that sector in autarky. Changes in a country’ labor quality
distribution affect the sectoral allocation of labor, even if the aggregate effective labor supply is
unchanged. International trade generally affects the wages of workers of different quality classes
differently. Trade specifically redistributes income towards relatively low quality workers if a
country exports the spillover sector good, and vice versa. The country that imports the spillover
sector good will reduce its domestic production of this good. As the pre-trade level or production
of this good is inefficiently low, free trade may reduce overall welfare.
Free trade equalizes the labor compensation of relatively high quality workers employed in
the marginal productivity wage setting sectors. Wages in the two national spillover sectors,
however, may not be equalized by international trade. Low quality workers employed in these
sectors, therefore, may face an incentive to migrate internationally. The implications of the
migration of spillover sector workers for the overall pattern of production and for the wages of
original spillover sector workers are somewhat unconventional. The immigration of prospective
spillover sector workers may either induce an expansion or a contraction of that sector at given
international goods prices. At the same time, such immigration may increase or decrease the real
wages of spillover sector workers. Interestingly, immigration may reduce the income of original
spillover sector workers by so much that national output at world prices is reduced. Free migration
potentially even reduces overall world welfare. Free migration will in fact reduce world welfare if
it lowers world supply of the spillover sector at pre-migration world goods prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic model.
Section 3 considers how changes in a country’s labor quality distribution affect its pattern of
production and the wages of all its workers. Section 4 examines the determination of comparative
advantage and the pattern of trade. Section 5 analyses free migation. Section 6 concludes.3
2. The model
These are two countries: home and foreign. Stars denote foreign variables. Homogeneous
labor is the only factor of production. Workers differ in the amount of labor they can supply. A
worker’s quality, denoted a, indicates his effective labor supply. The present model differs in this
regard from Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) who assume that educated and uneducated workers
provide intrinsically different kinds of labor. The two countries are symmetric in all respects other
than their labor quality distributions. The domestic labor quality variable, a, is distributed on the
interval [a,a ]with density f(a), and distribution function F(a). Let µ be the mean domestic worker
quality. Each economy’s entire effective labor supply is assumed to be unity, which implies that
there are 1/µ domestic workers or that There are two goods, denoted x and y. For F(a) 1/µ .
simplicity, let us assume that a unit of either good can be produced with a single unit of effective
labor. This assumption eliminates any Ricardian reasons for international trade and labor migration.
Let px be the price of good x in terms of good y. Good y will be taken to be the numeraire good.
The two sectors differ in their wage setting conventions. A worker of quality a employed in the x-
sector is paid his marginal product, i.e. pxa. Workers employed in the y-sector instead are paid the
average y-sector productivity. Specifically, y-sector workers are paid a wage equal to µy, where µy
stands for the average quality of y-sector workers.
Let us assume that the domestic economy does not specialize in production. Let ac then be
the quality of a domestic worker who is indifferent between working in either sector. This implies
that,
(1) px ac µy
All workers of a quality above (below) ac choose to work in the x-sector (y-sector). A
worker of minimum quality is indifferent between working in either sector from (1) if px =1 .At a
the other extreme, a worker of maximum quality is indifferent between working in either sector a
if . From (1), we generally see that . The sectoral outputs of goods px µ/a<1 p x µ y/a c £ 1











In general, there are multiple values of the threshold worker quality level, ac, and
corresponding production levels of x and y, for a given price of good x, px. There is a unique
threshold quality value, ac, and thus a unique pattern of production for a given value of px,



















Equation (4) is equivalent to , which is satisfies if the ac f(ac)/µ yF(ac)<1 / ( a c µ y)
effective labor offered by marginal workers, acf(ac), relative to the total effective labor of y-sector
workers, , is sufficiently small. µy F(ac)
Agents are assumd to have a logarithmic utility specification as follows,
(5) U a log(x) (1 a) log(y)
The general equilibrium in a closed economy can be represented as in Figure 1. The first
quadrant graphs the negative relationship between px and ac following the assumption that
in (4). It indicates that px is strictly bounded between and 1, if non-negligible dac /dp x <0 µ/a
amounts of both goods are produced. The second quadrant links the threshold quality level, ac,t o5
the production of good x according to (2). A higher value of ac implies that fewer workers are
employed in the x-sector, and thus that there is a lower x-sector output. The third quadrant simply




s ) . The fourth
quadrant represents the relative supply of good x, x
s/y
s, and the relative demand of good x, x
d/y
d,
both as a function of the goods price px.
3 The equilibrium goods price, denoted px’, is indicated by
the equality of the relative demand and supply of good x. Both goods are essential and will be
produced. The equilibrium price, px’, thus lies between and 1. At such an equilibrium price, µ/a
relative demand (and supply), x
d/( 1-x
d ) , exceeds a/(1 - a), which is the relative goods demand
with px = 1. The production of good y thus is reduced by the presence of labor quality spillovers in
that sector. To correct for this inefficiency, the authorities can institute a y-sector production or
wage subsidy combined with an x-sector production or wage tax.
4
3. The role of the distribution of individual labor qualities
In this section, we consider how changes in a country’s distribution of labor qualities affect
its pattern of production and the wage incomes received by all workers. Specifically, we consider
an exogenous change in the labor quality distribution of a small countery that takes world goods
prices as given. Let all foreign workers in a certain quality bracket migrate to the home country.
The variable a
* is taken to be the upper limit of this quality range. The notation da
* then stands for
a change in the top limit of the quality bracket of migating foreign workers.
If a
* >a c ,then the immigrants of quality a
* will be employed in the domestic x-sector. In
that instance, the production of good x increases, while the production of good y remains
unchanged. If instead a
* <a c ,then the immigrants will be employed in the domestic y-sector. Such
immigration generally changes the sectoral allocation of some original domestic workers. To see










where from (4). d(µy/a c)/dac dpx/da c <0
In (6), dac/da
* has the same sign as a
* -µ y . This implies that immigration causes some
original domestic x-sector workers to take up employment in the y-sector if ac >a
*>µ y , and vice
versa. In the first instance, the output of good y increases by more than the effective labor supply
of the immigrants in a Rybczynski-like fashion. Formally, the changes in sectoral outputs following










a f (a ) acf(ac)
dac
da
Note that the immigration of foreign workers with a
* =a chas indeterminate implications
for the domestic pattern of production. Such workers may choose to be employed in the x-sector,
in which case only the production of only good x increases. Alternatively, they may work in the y-
sector, triggering some original x-sector workers to switch to the y-sector, in which case the output
of the y-sector (x-sector) increases (decreases).
The implications of the immigration of prospective y-sector workers for individual and
national incomes are somewhat unconventional. The immigration of y-sector workers changes the




















d(µ y/a c)/da c
where dac/da
* has been substituted from (6). With ac >a
*>µ y , the immigration y-sector workers
and the accompanying increase in the range of original domestic workers employed in the y-sector7
both lead to an increase in the mean y-sector worker quality, µy. As a result, the wages of all y-
sector workers increase. This result is in contrast with the common notion that immigration leads
to the crowding out of directly competing original domestic workers and consequently lower real
wages for these workers. With a
* < µy, however, the immigration of y-sector workers may even
reduce the incomes of original y-sector workers by so much that such immigration reduces national
income at world prices. To see this, note that the value of national output, I, is affected by the
immigration of prospective y-sector workers as follows,
(10) dI
da
a f (a ) (1 px)a cf(ac)
dac
da
The first term on the right hand side of (10) is the direct, positive contribution of the
immigrants to y-sector output. The second term is the change in the value of the output of original
domestic workers following a change in their sectoral allocation. With a
* < µy, the second term is
negative as then dac/da
* <0and as px <1 . It is straightforward that expression (10) is unambi-
gously negative if a
* =0 .
5Overall, we see that the original home country y-sector workers are
harmed by (gain from) immigration if a
* < (>) µy, while they are indifferent if . As an a µy
implication, countries optimally restrict the immigration of low quality foreign workers with a
* <
µy.
6 Many countries, of course, in practice sort prospective immigrants on the basis of their
education and their work experience.
4. The pattern of trade and the welfare implications of trade
This section demonstrates that international trade may arise if the two countries differ in
their national labor quality distributions. Alternatively, trade can arise if the countries have
different underlying labor market distortions. These two sources of comparative advantage and
hence determinants of international trade are examined in turn. To conclude the section, we
examine the implications of international trade for factor prices and national welfare.
To start, let us consider that the two countries only differ in their labor market distributions
with labor market distortions as described before. The country that produces relatively much of
good x in autarky has the relatively low autarky price px, and as a result it exports good x in the8
trading equilibrium. The relative production of goods x and y reflects differences, if any, in the two
countries’ labor quality distributions. To see how differences in the national labor quality
distributions matter, let us take as the benchmark the case where the two national labor quality
distributions are equal so that there is no international trade. Now we can consider an influx of
workers of a quality q, with into the home country. If such an influx increases the a £ q £ a,
relative autarky production of good x in the home country at the autarky goods price px, then the
home country will exports good x in the trading equilibrium, and vice versa. We can now show the
following,
Proposition 1: Starting from equal national labor quality distributions, an influx of workers of
quality q, with into the home country implies that a £ q £ a,
(i) the home country export good x if q>a c
(ii) the pattern of trade is indeterminate if q=a c
(iii) the home country exports good y if a ’<q<a c
(iv) there is no trade if q=a ’
(v) the home country exports good x if q<a ’
with,




For a proof, see the Appendix. If , then the country with relatively many high a < a
quality workers of quality higher (lower) than ac will export good x (y). In this instance, cases (iv)
and (v) cannot apply. If instead , then the country that has relatively many workers at a > a
either end of the quality distribution (of a quality exceeding ac or lower than a’) will export good
x, while the country that has relatively many workers in the middle quality segment (of a quality
between a’ and ac) exports good y. This reflects that with a relative abundance of domestic a > a
workers of a quality lower than a’ discourages the relative production of good y in autarky and9
hence leads the home country to export good x in the trading equilibrium. Note that the condition
guarantees that we have . a 0 a > a
Next, let us assume that the countries differ in the labor market distortions underlying the
determination of wage incomes. For instance, we can assume that all foreign workers obtain their
marginal product, while in the home country, as before, y-sector (x-sector) workers receive their
average (marginal) product. In autarky, in the foreign country we have px = 1, while in the home
country we have px <1 . The foreign country thus exports good y in the trading equilibrium,
regardless of any difference in the labor force compositions between the two countries. Interestin-
gly, in the free trade equilibrium (at least) one of the two countries specializes in production. If
with free trade we have px = 1, then the home country specializes in good x, while the foreign
country produces good y. If instead with free trade we get px <1 , then the foreign country
specializes in the production of good y, while the home country produces good x. In the first
instance, free trade increases only home national welfare. In the second case, free trade instead
increases foreign national welfare, while the welfare implications for the y-importing home
country, as shown below, are ambiguous.
Next, we examine the implications of international trade for the sectoral distribution of
income. To this end, let us assume that the home country exports good x in the trading equilibri-
um. With free trade, the world goods price px is above the domestic autarky price. Domestic x-
sector workers benefit from trade, as their real wages increase in terms of good y. From (4), we
see that a higher px reduces ac, which implies that free trade leads to a reallocation of some
original y-sector workers to the x-sector. The mean worker quality, µy, in the y-sector thus falls,
which implies that the real wage of y-sector workers falls in terms of good y.A sp xrises, these
workers’ wage also falls in terms of good x.
7
To conclude this section, let us consider the impact of international trade on national
welfare. For this purpose, let us define V to be a utilitarian social welfare index. A change in the













s are again the production levels of x and y and where I=y
s+p x x
s . The first term
in (11) is the standard terms of trade effect on welfare given an existing production pattern. For a
country that exports good x, we have px x
s > aI. For such a country, an increase in px increases
national welfare at given production quantities. The second term represents the welfare implications
of the change in production following a change in the price px. According to (4), dac/dpx <0so
that the second term in (11) is negative with 1>p x .The increase in the production of good x
following an increase in the goods price px thus lowers national welfare. Note that expression (7) is
unambigously negative if px is increased just above the domestic autarky price of good x as in that
instance the first term in (11) vanishes.
5. Free migration
This section examines the welfare implications of free migration. Free migration, of course,
does not affect national welfares if free international goods trade is a substitute for free migration.
Note that free trade equalizes the real wages of workers in the x-sector. Free trade, however, does
not necessarily equalize µy and µy
* and consequently y-sector wages in the two countries.
8 Workers
employed in the y-sector thus generally retain an incentive to migrate if migration itself is assumed
to be costless. Domestic y-sector workers, specifically, can benefit from emigration if , and µy >µ y
vice versa.
As discussed, migration generally affects the incomes of non-immigrant workers in sending
and the receiving countries alike. What remains is to examine how free migration affects world
welfare, given by the sum of national welfares, V and V
*. World welfare is easily seen to increase
on account of free migration if migration enlarges the world’s y-sector production at pre-migration
world prices, and versa. Let us assume that in the pre-migration world the highest qualified
domestic y-sector worker is less qualified than his foreign counterpart. Formally, this implies ac <
ac
*. If (4) holds for both countries, then free migration leads to a worldwide threshold worker
quality, ac
w, at pre-migration world goods prices, such that ac <a c
w<a c
* .
9As a result of free
migration, some original domestic x-sector worker switch to the y-sector, while some original
foreign y-sector workers switch to the x-sector. Following the reallocation of workers in both
countries, the change in the world output of good y, denoted d ( y+y
*) , is given as follows,11












a f (a )d a
Expression (12) can be positive or negative. This is best illustrated as follows. Let us
assume that the foreign population consists of two groups with distinct quality levels. In particular,
let there be nl
* and nh
* foreign workers of quality al
* and ah
*, respectively, with al
* <a h
* . Let us




* =( 1-a )/a, which guarantees that all workers of quality al
* work in
the foreign y-sector in autarky. Let us further assume that all foreign workers of quality ah
* work
in the x-sector in autarky and with free trade with or without free migration.
10 The home country
instead has a continuous labor quality distribution as considered above. In autarky, both countries
have a goods price px less than one. With free trade, we also have px < 1. With free migration, the
two national y-sectors can be seen as merging. As a result of this merger, some original domestic
x-sector workers will be employed in the y-sector if µy <a l
*<a cfor a given pre-migration price
px. Worldwide fewer y-sector workers will be employed in this sector if instead al
* <µ yof if al
* >
ac. In these instances, free migration thus lowers the world supply of good y and overall world
welfare. Note that average productivity wage setting in the y-sector may lead to welfare-reducing
international migration, even though all workers remain employed. In practice, migration can of
course lead to increased unemployment in the labor receiving country, providing an additional
reason why migration may be welfare reducing.
11
6. Conclusion
This paper considers international trade and migration in a simple model where labor of
heterogeneous quality is the only factor of production. The paper shows that international
differences in the labor quality distributions and in the sectoral wage setting institutions each
provide reasons for international trade and migration. An international difference in the sectoral
wage setting process specifically is shown to be a reason for trade or migration regardless of the
two countries’ labor quality distributions. If wage setting arrangements instead are symmetric in the
two countries, then there can be international trade or migration if the national quality distributions
are sufficiently different in the sense that relative sectoral outputs in autarky differ.12
A country endowed with relatively many workers at the top end of the labor quality
distribution is shown to export the good produced in the sector characterized by marginal
productivity wage setting in the trading equilibrium. International trade or migration in the
presence of average productivity wage setting in a sector can reduce a country’s welfare. The
immigration of below-average y-sector workers specifically reduces the aggregate income of a
country’s original workers at existing world goods prices. The model thus provides a rationale for
restricting the immigration of lowly qualified foreign workers.
Sectoral and international migration generate externalities in the present analysis on
account of the average productivity wage setting. More conventionally, migration creates externali-
ties, as it affects the physical marginal producitivity of non-migrating factors of production in the
labor sending and receiving countries. Alternatively, migration gives rise to externalities as it
affects international congestion levels. The present analysis of migration can be extended to
account for these additional external effects of migration.13
Appendix: Proof of proposition 1.
(i) If q>a c , then dx
s >0and dy
s =0at autarky prices. The home country thus exports good
x.
(ii) If q=a c , then an influx of workers increases the output of good x (y), if these workers are
employed in the x-sector (y-sector). Note that if immigrants of quality ac join the y-sector, then
some original x-sector workers will be induced to also join the y-sector. The impact on the pattern
of trade is ambiguous.
(iii) - (v) Let q<a c . Consider that there is an influx of workers of quality q drawn from a density
g(q). The notation dq stands for an increase of the range of workers that is part of the influx. The


















where we use that x
s +y
s=1 .





If the above expression is zero with q=a ’ , this implies,14
µy >a
f(ac)µ y
f(ac) xF(ac)[d( µ y/a c)/da c]
>0
as d(µy/ac)/dac <0from (4).
Parts (iii) - (v) of the proposition now follow.15
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Endnotes
1. Several contributions, including Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1971), Jones (1971) and Neary
(1978), consider the implications for the pattern of production and for factor rewards of an
exogenously given wage differential in a two sector model.
2. Rivera-Batiz (1983) also considers migration in the presence of a goods market distortion
in the form of tariffs.
3. It is straightforward that the relative goods demand, x
s/y









4. A government interested in maximizing a utilitarian social welfare index can set the y-






where ac and thus µy are selected such that x
s/y
s = a/(1 - a).
5. It is also interesting to consider changes in technology. In the text, we have assumed that
the production of a unit of either good requires one unit of effective labor. Technological
improvement in the x-sector can be modeled as a reduction in the effective unit labor
requirement in that sector below unity. Such a technological improvement is welfare
improving in so far as it improves the labor productivity of original x-sector workers. At
the same time, it induces some y-sector workers to switch to the x-sector. This switch
reduces the value of national output at world prices. On net, the welfare consequences of
technological progress in the x-sector at given world goods prices are ambiguous.
6. A country’s labor quality distribution can be affected by education as well as by migration.
Education can be modeled as an increase in the labor quality,a , for some workers. With
given goods prices, the education of x-sector workers is beneficial as it simply increases x-
sector output. The education of y-sector workers, however, potentially lowers social
welfare. This can be the case if the workers being educated originally were above-average
y-sector workers, and if the education induces them to switch towards the x-sector. In this
instance, education lowers the average quality of remaining y-sector workers, µy, which
implies additional, welfare-reducing switches of y-sector workers to the x-sector.
7. Note that workers that switch from the y-sector to the x-sector may either lose or benefit
from international trade. All switched workers, in particular, below a certain quality level
lose, while the remaining switched workers stand to gain from international trade.
8. Note that the country that has the relatively high y-sector wage may well export this good
in the free trade equilibrium.17
9. Equation (4), its foreign counterpart and the fact that ac <a c
*together imply that
µ
* (ac)/ac >p x> µ(ac
*)/ a c
* . Let µ





* . The result that ac <a c
w<a c
*now follows.
10. Note that there is a range of the goods price px such that all high-quality (low-quality)
foreign workers prefer to work in the x-sector (y-sector) on account of the average
productivity wage settting in the y-sector. In the pre-migration case, this is the case if
al
*/ah
* <p x<1 .
11. Morrison (1993) investigates empirically the implications of internal migration in Peru
taking into account the negative externalities of urbanization in an environment characteri-
zed by unemployment and distorted relative prices. Migration is argued to have had a
positive net impact on the country’s GDP.